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Mongolia's international security and nuclear-weapon-free status

Report of the Secretary-General**

Summary

Pursuant to General Assembly resolution 57/67, Member States were invited to continue to cooperate with Mongolia in taking the necessary measures to consolidate and strengthen Mongolia's independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity, the inviolability of its borders, its economic security, its ecological balance and its nuclear-weapon-free status, as well as its independent foreign policy.

In the same resolution, the Secretary-General and relevant United Nations bodies were requested to continue to provide assistance to Mongolia in taking the necessary measures in this regard.

The present report contains an account of new developments and the assistance accorded to Mongolia by the Secretariat and relevant United Nations bodies since the issuance of the last report on this subject in 2000 (A/57/159). During the reporting period, the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific held a series of informal consultations on ways and means whereby Mongolia could achieve recognition of its nuclear-weapon-free status at the international level. In this regard, the following options have been identified by Mongolia: (i) conclusion of a legal instrument on Mongolia's nuclear-weapon-free status with its two immediate neighbours — China and the Russian Federation — with a separate protocol to be signed by the five nuclear-weapon States; and (ii) international recognition and institutionalization of its nuclear-weapon-free status through the creation of an international custom on the status.

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During the reporting period, the Department of Economic and Social Affairs and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) undertook two studies, respectively, on the economic vulnerabilities and human security in Mongolia and on the ecological vulnerabilities and human security in Mongolia. The findings of these studies are contained in the present report. Furthermore, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and UNDP have been engaged in assisting Mongolia to improve its capacity to respond to natural disasters.

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I. Introduction

1. By its resolution 57/67 of 22 November 2002, entitled "Mongolia's international security and nuclear-weapon-free status", the General Assembly invited Member States to continue to cooperate with Mongolia in taking the necessary measures to consolidate and strengthen Mongolia's independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity, the inviolability of its borders, its economic security, its ecological balance and its nuclear-weapon-free status, as well as its independent foreign policy. It requested the Secretary-General and relevant United Nations bodies to continue to provide assistance to Mongolia in taking the aforementioned necessary measures. It also requested the Secretary-General to report to the Assembly at its fifty-ninth session on the implementation of the resolution. The present report is submitted in compliance with that request.

II. Activities related to Mongolia's nuclear-weapon-free status

2. Since the submission of the last report of the Secretary-General on this subject (A/57/159), the United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs, through its Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific, has continued to provide Mongolia with assistance to take the necessary measures in consolidating and strengthening its nuclear-weapon-free status.

3. In that connection, the Centre held a series of consultations with Mongolia, the five nuclear-weapon States and other interested States on ways and means to strengthen Mongolia's nuclear-weapon-free status. To further international recognition and institutionalization of its nuclear-weapon-free status, the following options were being considered by Mongolia: (i) conclusion of a legal instrument on Mongolia's nuclear-weapon-free status with its two immediate neighbours — China and the Russian Federation — with a separate protocol to be signed by all five nuclear-weapon States; and (ii) international recognition and institutionalization of its nuclear-weapon-free status through the creation of an international custom on the status.

4. Mongolia believes that the first option is the most suitable and practically implementable. In this respect, Mongolia presented, in February 2002, the draft "Basic Elements of a Treaty between Mongolia, the People's Republic of China and the Russian Federation on Mongolia's Nuclear-Weapon-Free Status". China responded positively to the idea of concluding a treaty among the three States. On the occasion of the visit of the President of Mongolia to China on 6 July 2004, the two countries signed a joint statement which, inter alia, stated, "... the two sides believed that Mongolia's nuclear-weapon-free status was useful for strengthening regional stability. The Chinese side expressed its support for Mongolia's efforts to secure this status ...". Russia also expressed informally its readiness to resume consultations on the issue of concluding a trilateral legal instrument on Mongolia's nuclear-weapon-free status.

5. Another option to be pursued by Mongolia in parallel with the first option will be to seek to have its nuclear-weapon-free status recognized and institutionalized at the international level. Mongolia believes that a new international custom on its nuclear-weapon-free status could be created through continued and consistent references made by international organizations in support of such a status in their

relevant documents. In this respect, Mongolia feels that it is important to develop, in collaboration with legal experts and analysts, the exact wording and form of reference to be used in such documents that would serve as a proof of the emergence of a new international custom on its nuclear-weapon-free status.

III. Non-nuclear aspects of Mongolia's international security

6. In response to a request from the Government of Mongolia, the Department of Economic and Social Affairs, with the support of the United Nations Resident Coordinator and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Mongolia Country Office in Ulaanbaatar, undertook a scoping mission to Mongolia in June 2002 with the objective to map out the process of developing the proposed studies on economic and ecological vulnerabilities and to outline their possible content. A consultative meeting with the Permanent Mission of Mongolia to the United Nations, UNDP, the Department of Economic and Social Affairs, the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), the Department of Public Information, the Department of Political Affairs, the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and the International Atomic Energy Agency was organized in January 2004 by the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific. It was agreed that the Department of Economic and Social Affairs and UNDP would assist Mongolia in strengthening its international security by undertaking the two studies on economic vulnerabilities and ecological vulnerabilities.

Economic vulnerabilities and human security in Mongolia

7. The Department of Economic and Social Affairs undertook a mission to Mongolia from 24 May to 5 June 2004 in order to prepare a study entitled "Economic vulnerabilities and human security in Mongolia". The mission held meetings with, among others, the United Nations Resident Coordinator and representatives of the UNDP Mongolia Country Office in Ulaanbaatar, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Economic Standing Committee of Parliament, the Ministry of Finance and Economy, the Ministry of Industry and Trade, the National Security Council, the National Statistical Office, the Central Bank of Mongolia, the Mongolian National University, the Mongolian Academy of Science, opposition leaders, representatives of the United Nations Population Fund, the World Bank and research institutes and non-governmental organizations.

8. The study covered: (i) the macroeconomic performance of Mongolia; (ii) relevant institutional aspects; (iii) Mongolia's competitiveness; (iv) poverty and inequality in Mongolia; (v) disparities in urban and rural development; (vi) environmentally sound approaches to Mongolia's development, (vii) prospects for subregional and regional integration; and (viii) the Mongolian model of economic development. While the ecological and environmental challenges of Mongolia were examined in detail in a UNDP companion study, the Department of Economic and Social Affairs study examined economic challenges and vulnerability from a sustainability angle, which subsumes effects of economic activity on the environment, and the concern for ensuring that natural endowments are not depleted but remain for the use of future generations. The core purpose of this study therefore was to document and analyse in depth and in a holistic way the economic, social, human, environmental and related vulnerabilities in Mongolia.

9. The major findings and recommendations of the study are as follows:

Growth and sustainable development

- The most important vulnerability issue for Mongolia is how the economic, social and environmental vulnerabilities will evolve with the high growth rates projected by the Government, based on an expansion of copper, gold and cashmere production — in particular, what that expansion means for employment, income distribution, and the environment
- A key economic vulnerability of Mongolia is the price volatility of gold and copper as well as cashmere, which will affect the future growth of gross domestic product. In the study, it was argued that it is important that the prosperous times, generated by exports of such commodities as gold and copper, are used as an opportunity to provide the kind of economic and social investments, rather than consumption, whose benefits can stretch well into the future
- There is a need to devise a further contingency strategy for the eventuality of a commodity price collapse. The windfall increase in government revenue from a commodity price increase should be treated as an opportunity to set aside funds in a reserve rather than as an assured growth in national revenue or a platform for current consumption
- National disaster preparedness is a clear response to the many natural vulnerabilities that Mongolia faces and is the subject of considerable international cooperation. As a domestic response, the National Disaster Management Agency (NDMA) was created in January 2004. This can be regarded as a positive development, in a move away from civil defence to disaster preparedness and management, including how to deal with the dzud (a Mongolia-specific winter disaster caused by a combination of summer drought and early and heavy snowstorms with temperatures falling further below average)
- The Government and the new NDMA, in particular, may wish to consider for inclusion in their top national priorities the use of technologies for emergency shelters and supplies for human beings and animals in the event of another dzud. Creation of an international disaster fund for dzud relief might be considered

Development finance

- Official development assistance (ODA) has served as a shock absorber and has taken up some of the burden that was borne by Mongolia prior to 1990, with the assistance received from the former Soviet Union
- Servicing ODA provides a well-remunerated occupation for educated Mongolians and is likely to be so for the immediate future. The secondary benefits that accrue from learning about ODA and the procedures and management styles of donors can help Mongolia to develop its own advisory services in ODA and project management
- The study flags three important issues related to domestic savings which the Government may wish to examine further: (i) the need for accurate reporting

of savings in kind; (ii) the need to mobilize private savings in rural areas; and (iii) the spread between lending and borrowing rates, which is usually biased against the small savers

Industrial development

- Mongolia may wish to compensate its deindustrialization, the closure of many of its industrial enterprises as a result of foreign competition, with new productive activities outside the primary sector, because the primary sector is ecologically fragile and cannot in the long term easily support the 6 per cent or higher growth rates required to attain the Millennium Development Goals
- Mongolia may wish to make full use of its quota-free access to the textile markets of the United States and the European Union. Incentives should be provided, within the rules of the World Trade Organization (WTO), to cashmere producers to enable them to compete with foreign producers who enjoy lower interest rates
- Mongolia may wish to make full use of the flexibility it currently enjoys under WTO rules to impose selective protective tariffs for industries in which it is competitive and to maintain them low or eliminate them for products in which it has no local industry or in which it could not be competitive

Service sector development

- Mongolia may wish to make use of its highly qualified workforce to develop "weightless" information and knowledge-based industries. These industries can absorb a greater number of young workers who are otherwise absorbed in servicing ODA
- With proper incentives, Mongolian engineering and consultancy firms should be able to compete for international contracts
- The study considers that the Government would need further assistance and support in strengthening its negotiating capacity to deal with the international trade and financial institutions, inter alia, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and WTO

Mongolia in international groupings

- Pursuing South-South cooperation and seeking assistance from new ODA donors can prove to be very important avenues for international cooperation for Mongolia. The Government may wish to utilize the landlocked developing countries category of the United Nations for this purpose and to strengthen economic and technical cooperation links with developed landlocked countries
- Foreign direct investment increases Mongolia's security by providing a greater variety of international partners with an economic stake in the progress of the country
- Mongolia may also wish to develop world-class environmental standards, with the help of UNEP and counterpart environmental agencies in the home countries of major investors

- This study has flagged the need to improve sustainable forestry management to counteract the deforestation that has occurred since the 1990s
- With respect to issues related to transit countries, the trilateral agreement among Mongolia and its neighbours, China and Russia, which is currently negotiated actively by Mongolia, with the advisory services of various United Nations entities, including the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development and the Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, is one that can prove to be a model to other landlocked developing countries

10. The analysis of the present study has confirmed that, on balance, the economic, social and environmental vulnerabilities in Mongolia have increased significantly since 1990, notwithstanding all the policy reforms undertaken. There is good legal and administrative infrastructure in place to deal with these vulnerabilities. Facing those challenges, as it is widely appreciated, is a task primarily for the national Government. However, the international community needs to maintain its strong commitment to partnering with Mongolia and not using the recent rise in economic growth rates as a reason to turn their interests and financing elsewhere. As it has been pointed out, the growth is based on a fragile economic, social and environmental base that requires careful attention from policy makers and their international partners. It is only with the joint national and international approach exemplified by the Millennium Development Goals and the Monterrey Consensus that Mongolia will be able to address successfully its many vulnerabilities and eventually achieve human security for all Mongolians.

Ecological vulnerabilities and human security in Mongolia

11. UNDP has undertaken close cooperative efforts with the Government to review and address the economic and ecological vulnerabilities of Mongolia, pursuant to the current UNDP Country Cooperation Framework for Mongolia (2002-2006) as well as General Assembly resolution 57/67.

12. Fully taking into account Mongolia's political and economic transition and also its unique geographic and environmental status, UNDP has focused on democratic governance, economic transition and poverty reduction, and sustainable natural resource management in the aforementioned Country Cooperation Framework. These three main thrusts are intertwined so as to promote equitable and sustainable development of the country and assist in achieving the Millennium Development Goals by 2015.

13. Regarding democratic governance, UNDP has assisted in programmes aimed at improving the accountability, transparency and responsiveness of the Government and other parties so that the improved governance will ensure equitable economic development and prudent management of natural resources. Main UNDP projects from 2002 to 2004 include support to the Government's Good Governance for Human Security programme, capacity development of the National Human Rights Commission of Mongolia and strengthening of the Parliament. Based on the discussions at the donors' Consultative Group Meeting, held in Tokyo in November 2003, a new programme for aid coordination has been developed as well.

14. In the area of economic transition and poverty reduction, UNDP has focused on strengthening the analytical capacity of the Government through the

establishment of a Poverty Research Group in the Ministry of Finance and Economy, gender-sensitive budgeting and HIV/AIDS prevention. UNDP also supported the Government in launching the 2003 National Human Development Report, which sheds light on deepening inequalities and disparities between urban and rural areas and thereby advocates pro-poor growth and balanced development. The UNDP study on Mongolia's ecological vulnerabilities suggested that more investment is needed by the Government, municipalities and donors to reduce urban poverty. In order to help exchange experiences of and acquire comparative perspectives on important lessons learned in transition economies over the past two decades across the regions, UNDP invited the delegation of the Mongolian Government to the high-level International Policy Conference on Transition Economies, organized by UNDP in Hanoi on 31 May and 1 June 2004, which was attended by some 200 participants, including senior officials, professors, policy makers, representatives of the mass media and researchers from Asia, the countries members of the Commonwealth of Independent States and countries of Central and Eastern Europe.

15. Sustainable natural resource management has been the biggest portfolio of the UNDP Country Office in Ulaanbaatar. Since Mongolia's recent economic growth and sources of livelihood for the poor have been drawn primarily from natural resource extraction, UNDP has concentrated its assistance on institutional building and research aimed at providing the basis for policy formulations and implementations regarding natural resource management. UNDP biodiversity programmes undertaken in the eastern steppes, Gobi and Altai-Sayan regions cover the three ecological zones of Mongolia. The Sustainable Grassland Management project intends to improve pastureland management for better breeding of pastoral livestock, which has been Mongolia's principal and traditional agricultural sector. The energy-efficiency housing project is intended to protect Mongolia's environment through advocating both to public and private sectors innovative technology and construction methods to reduce carbon dioxide emission. Furthermore, to assist with tackling extraordinary development challenges that Mongolia faces owing to its climate and topography, particularly to reinforce its preparedness against the dzud, UNDP has initiated a disaster management project.

16. The study on "Ecological Vulnerabilities and Human Security in Mongolia" was conducted, funded and supported by the UNDP Mongolia Country Office in Ulaanbaatar. The study was chiefly undertaken by an international expert in collaboration with a national consultant. The team had extensive consultation and discussion with a number of line ministries, local governors, university professors, researchers, bilateral and multilateral donors and civil society organizations. The team further conducted site-visits to pastoral areas, gold mine areas, forests and reforested areas, solid waste disposal sites, ger (nomadic dwelling) neighbourhoods, and various other locations throughout the country.

17. The study has identified ecological security issues that affect Mongolia's present and future. Those natural resource and environmental management concerns range from air and water pollution to solid and hazardous waste, harsh climate and recent climate change, natural disasters, deforestation and desertification, loss of biodiversity, land degradation and the lack of Government's capacity effectively and efficiently to formulate, implement and enforce ecological regulations and policies. The report relates Mongolia's ecological vulnerability concerns to the pressure on the natural environment created by the Mongolian economy. Continuation of the

traditional reliance on dispersed animal husbandry based on the fragile natural grassland and the recent surge in mining activities may not be compatible with environmental sustainability.

18. The recommendations to the Government proposed in the study include the establishment and operationalization of a legal and financial framework to guarantee sustainable management of water, pasture, land, forests and other natural resources, implementation of the "polluter pays" principle, regional and international cooperation on climate change, environment-friendly mining, an improved response to natural disasters, raising awareness about energy conservation and proper management of waste. This report was refined, incorporating feedback from a wide range of stakeholders, domestic and international, as well as from other United Nations agencies, including the Department of Economic and Social Affairs and UNEP.

Natural disaster response capacity of Mongolia

19. Mongolia is prone to a variety of natural disasters, i.e. the dzud, flash floods, sand and snow storms and earthquakes. The effect of these disasters is exacerbated by the extreme climate in the country, i.e. winter temperatures reaching -40° C in Ulaanbaatar — where more than one third of the country's population resides. The Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and UNDP have been engaged in assisting the Government of Mongolia to improve its capacity to respond to natural disasters. Of note is the UNDP project which assisted in the enactment of a new disaster management law in June 2003 and the creation of the National Disaster Management Agency (NDMA) earlier this year. After NDMA was established under the Office of the Prime Minister, the Government of Mongolia requested the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs to send a United Nations Disaster Assessment and Coordination (UNDAC) team to analyse the entire disaster response system in the country and recommend ways of improving it. The 10-member UNDAC team, composed of emergency management experts from the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, China, Japan, the Netherlands, the Philippines, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom, was in Mongolia from 27 June to 10 July 2004 and met with representatives of all concerned government departments, United Nations agencies, the Mongolian Red Cross, non-governmental organizations, the World Bank, donors, such as the Japan International Cooperation Agency and the United States Agency for International Development as well as the city government of Ulaanbaatar. It also made field visits to the aimags (provinces) of Darkhan, Bulgan, Uvs, Uvurkhangai and Bayanhongor.

20. The UNDAC team observed that though much attention was given to the incidence of the dzud in Mongolia, the most problematic natural disaster conceivable would be an earthquake in Ulaanbaatar in winter in which the power plants supplying the city would be damaged. Owing to the extremely low temperatures (-40° C) and Mongolia's very limited capacity for urban search and rescue activities, a large number of casualties is possible. Such a scenario would require rapid and immediate international assistance, especially from international urban search and rescue teams. To prepare for such an eventuality, Mongolia needs to be involved with the International Search and Rescue Advisory Group (INSARAG) Asia-Pacific regional group as soon as possible (the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs is the secretariat for INSARAG). Before the UNDAC team left Mongolia it submitted a report entitled "UNDAC Mission to

Mongolia, Assessment of National Disaster Response Capacity, 27 June-9 July 2004" to the Government of Mongolia and the United Nations Resident Coordinator, which covers the entire spectrum of disaster management in Mongolia. In the report, the UNDAC team had discussed the national legal and governmental framework for disaster response, the National Disaster Management Agency, national and local disaster response capacity, disaster contingency planning, monitoring, damage assessment and needs analysis capacity and public awareness and education. The report contained 33 specific recommendations and a suggested time frame for their implementation. In a letter to the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator dated 20 July 2004, the Prime Minister of Mongolia expressed his appreciation for the UNDAC mission and the report. He stated, furthermore, that the recommendations contained in the report were "well thought through and practical" and that the Government of Mongolia looked forward to implementing them "at the earliest".

IV. Conclusion

21. **As described above, Mongolia's nuclear-weapon-free status, as well as its other efforts to strengthen its international security, have met with wide international support. In this connection, the United Nations has extended its assistance to Mongolia for the promotion of its international security and its nuclear-weapon-free status. The Secretary-General hopes that the assistance provided by the United Nations will greatly contribute to the consolidation and strengthening of Mongolia's nuclear-weapon-free status at the international level. The United Nations will continue to assist Mongolia in ensuring its nuclear-weapon-free status to be effective and recognized at the international level. Furthermore, the United Nations system as a whole in Mongolia will continue to assist the country in coping with economic and ecological vulnerabilities, especially those identified in the recent United Nations-led studies. The Secretary-General also hopes that the assistance provided by the United Nations will contribute to achieving sustainable development and balanced growth in Mongolia under political and economic transition, reinforcing Mongolia's efforts at achieving the Millennium Development Goals. The Secretary-General welcomes support from the international community to strengthen the non-nuclear aspects of international security in Mongolia. The Secretary-General would also encourage Member States to utilize the INSARAG mechanism to assist Mongolia in building urban search and rescue capacity in Mongolia.**

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Strengthened and unified security management system for the United Nations

Report of the Secretary-General

Summary

The present report examines the current state of the United Nations security system and reviews the changes that have been made since the issuance of the report of the Secretary-General of 15 October 2001 on inter-organizational security measures (A/56/469 and Corr.1 and 2). It contains a number of recommendations for organizational reform aimed at better meeting the evolving security threat against United Nations staff who are fulfilling the mandates of the Organization throughout the world. The report builds on earlier reviews carried out by external panels of experts and takes into consideration recommendations made to improve the security arrangements of the United Nations made by an independent panel following the attacks on United Nations headquarters in Baghdad in August and September 2003.

The report also contains major recommendations for the unification and strengthening of the security management system of the United Nations, namely:

- The existing security structures of the Secretariat, including the Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator, the United Nations Security and Safety Services and the security component of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations should be amalgamated into a new Directorate of Security
- The Directorate should be headed by an Under-Secretary-General reporting directly to the Secretary-General
- The Directorate should acquire significant new capabilities in the areas of security threat and risk assessment, operational support in the field, policies and standards, compliance and evaluation, human resources management of security staff and training
- In order to provide an adequate level of security for United Nations staff who are providing assistance to people in need throughout the world, there should be a significant increase in the number of security personnel, particularly in the field
- The current cost-sharing arrangements for field security should be phased out and security costs should be centrally funded from the assessed resources of the Organization

I. Introduction

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to three resolutions adopted by the General Assembly. In section VIII of its resolution 56/255 of 24 December 2001, the Assembly requested the Secretary-General to conduct an evaluation of the United Nations security system. In its resolution 57/155 of 16 December 2002, the Assembly requested the Secretary-General to take the necessary measures to ensure that security matters were an integral part of the planning for existing and newly mandated United Nations operations. In the same resolution, the Assembly recognized the need for a strengthened and unified security management system for the United Nations, at both the headquarters and field levels, and requested the United Nations system, as well as Member States, to take all appropriate measures to that end. Finally, the report responds to Assembly resolution 58/295 of 18 June 2004, wherein the Secretary-General was requested to submit to the Assembly at its fifty-ninth session a comprehensive report on the further strengthening of the safety and security of United Nations operations, staff and premises. The present report should be considered in conjunction with the report of the Secretary-General on safety and security of humanitarian personnel and protection of United Nations personnel (A/59/332).

II. Background

2. For the first half-century of its existence, the United Nations felt protected by its flag and the perception that it was a neutral, benevolent actor in world events. Beginning in the early 1990s, there was a rise in the number of deaths and injuries of staff members as a result of malicious acts. The majority of those incidents occurred because the staff member was in the wrong place at the wrong time. When United Nations personnel were directly targeted, it was generally viewed as an isolated event.

3. Regrettably, in recent years the security environment for the United Nations has changed and become more threatening. In addition, the mandates of the United Nations have evolved, resulting in a larger number of United Nations staff members, notably from the humanitarian agencies, being deployed on potentially hazardous missions. At the same time, peacekeeping missions were being established in areas at war or in situations of high risk. Increasingly, humanitarian staff are being deployed alongside military units in integrated multidisciplinary missions.

4. In response to the deteriorating security environment and in order to allow the United Nations to meet the new demands, the General Assembly, beginning in 1999, authorized a series of increases in the staff of the Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator, primarily in the field. In 2001, the Assembly authorized the creation of a full-time United Nations Security Coordinator at the level of Assistant Secretary-General. In 2002, the number of professional security officer posts in the field was increased from 64 (funded through country-level cost-sharing, consolidated humanitarian appeals or voluntary contributions to the Trust Fund for Security of Staff Members of the United Nations System) to 100 Professional and 200 locally recruited posts (the entire costs of which were shared among organizations of the United Nations system). The Headquarters staff of the Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator was increased from 19 posts (9 Professional and 10 General Service) to its present total of 38 posts

(24 Professional and 14 General Service), funded primarily by the regular budget but with some field support costs shared among organizations of the United Nations system and others funded from the peacekeeping support account. Diligent efforts were made by the United Nations Security Coordinator in the biennium 2002-2003 to professionalize the Organization's security staff through improved recruitment and training and to institutionalize security coordination among United Nations agencies and programmes through the establishment of the Inter-Agency Security Management Network. Enhanced support has been provided to designated officials in the field, and security awareness on the part of the staff has increased through training. An accountability framework was established in 2002 as well, as outlined by the Secretary-General in his report on inter-organizational security measures: framework for accountability for the United Nations field security management system (A/57/365).

5. An evaluation of the United Nations security management system was carried out by a team of independent security experts. The study was finalized in August 2003, just prior to the attack of 19 August in Baghdad. The experts examined the different ways in which security was delivered within the United Nations and concluded that the development and implementation of an overall security governance and accountability framework, including Headquarters, humanitarian and development staff and peacekeeping missions, would lead to a strengthened and unified security management system. That, in turn, would lead to greater safety, security and protection of United Nations personnel. The team believed that it was inappropriate to continue to deal with security in a compartmentalized way: multiple security systems can create doubt in the minds of those who have to work under pressure. Doubt can lead to mistakes and mistakes in security terms can lead to serious injury and loss of life.

6. Despite the growing security concerns and the efforts made to address them, the suicide truck-bomb attack on the United Nations headquarters at the Canal Hotel in Baghdad on 19 August 2003 came as a devastating shock. The attack killed 22 United Nations staff and visitors and injured more than 150. Although there had been other direct attacks on United Nations staff and operations, such as in West Timor and Tajikistan, this was the first terrorist attack in which the United Nations was targeted as an institution with the deliberate intention of inflicting mass casualties.

7. A few weeks after the explosion of 19 August, the United Nations was subjected to another attack against the Canal Hotel, resulting in 2 deaths and 19 injuries, including 2 United Nations national staff. There have been repeated subsequent threats to locally recruited staff and one death. In Afghanistan, one United Nations international staff member has been killed and a number of offices have been attacked. More than 30 Afghan election workers from the Joint Electoral Monitoring Board have been killed, along with 2 contracted international security personnel and a number of international and locally employed personnel from non-governmental organizations. In addition, information posted on the Internet by various groups has relayed repeated threats against the United Nations.

8. It is clear that the threats against the United Nations have fundamentally escalated. The report of the Independent Panel on the Safety and Security of United Nations Personnel on its investigation of the Baghdad attack, led by Martti Ahtisaari, made the following stark assessment: "The United Nations could in

theory be the target of attacks anywhere at any time, from Baghdad to Kabul, Nairobi, Jakarta, Geneva or New York. There are no indications that the perpetrators of the attacks in Baghdad would refrain from attacking other UN targets worldwide". The Ahtisaari panel accordingly called for a new, drasticall revised security strategy for the United Nations. The Panel recommended that the core elements of the new strategy include an in-depth review and reform of the United Nations security system; clear guidance by and clear responsibilities of the United Nations to ensure the security of its staff; the availability of professional assessment tools for the collection of information on potential threats and for the analysis of risk for United Nations operations worldwide; a robust security management system with adequate disciplinary measures to counter non-compliance; accountability at all managerial levels for the implementation of security regulations; and significant increases in resources to develop and maintain the necessary security infrastructure.

9. A concerted effort has accordingly been made across the United Nations system to improve and strengthen security arrangements. The Secretary-General has initiated a number of follow-up actions, which include a survey by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations of compliance with minimum operating security standards in field missions; the development by the Department and the Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator of a system-wide procedure for threat and risk assessment; the development, upgrading and independent evaluation of baseline minimum operating security standards to deal with new threats to headquarters and field activities; and an examination of the possible use of the standby humanitarian arrangements of the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs in the event of future crises involving mass casualties among United Nations personnel. The Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator has developed a joint planning process to integrate security considerations more closely into the design and conduct of United Nations field activities. Technical guidance has been issued on improvements in equipment and facilities that have been recommended to counter the threat of explosive attacks. All these measures, however, can be taken only as an initial "first-aid" response — indispensable for survival, but falling well short of the more definitive measures that are now required to equip the United Nations to operate in a more complex and volatile environment.

10. During 2004, the Inter-Agency Security Management Network has addressed a range of security-related issues. It has endorsed the risk-management model and recommended its immediate adoption as a tool to enable the articulation of security risks at the local, regional and headquarters levels. The Network has adopted upgraded minimum operating security standards, which will assist each country team to develop country-specific security requirements. Notable progress was made on standards and plans for an enhanced medical system to respond to critical incidents involving mass casualties, in coordination with the medical services of the United Nations system. Advances were also made in the area of aviation safety.

11. Enhancements to the minimum operating security standards and the need for a strong security presence in the field entail significant expenditures for United Nations agencies, funds and programmes. As at early February 2004, only the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), the World Food Programme (WFP), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) and the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) had programmed additional security expenditures for the next biennium, totalling about

$51 million. More costs are certain to be incurred by United Nations agencies, funds and programmes as those bodies continue to identify and finance the increased security requirements arising out of new risks and security standards at the most exposed of their many facilities and activities worldwide.

12. In April 2004, the Secretary-General submitted to the General Assembly a report informing Member States of the measures that had been taken to enhance safety and security and requesting resources for the first phase of implementation of urgently needed new measures worldwide (A/58/756). Those measures consisted of security infrastructure enhancements and new security posts for high-risk duty stations. In response, the General Assembly, in June 2004, authorized additional expenditures on the order of $85.9 million. While the largest proportion of the funds was for infrastructure at headquarters locations, 29 additional international and 29 locally recruited field posts were authorized for the Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator to be funded under interim arrangements pending a review of the overall United Nations security management system, including cost-sharing, during the fifty-ninth session.

13. In the same report, the Secretary-General also advised Member States that he would be submitting a request for additional resources at the fifty-ninth session of the General Assembly. That request would be for resources for a new, unified and significantly strengthened security management system, including a major increase in the number of established posts for security personnel at Headquarters and in the field.

III. Existing security management system

14. The primary responsibility for the security and protection of staff members, their spouses, dependants and property rests with the host Government. The Secretary-General, on the advice of the United Nations Security Coordinator and designated officials, determines in each case the nature and extent of security arrangements to be made by the United Nations, based on his analysis of any given situation. The United Nations endeavours in all cases to facilitate the tasks of host Governments and local authorities in the discharge of their obligations and consults with them as appropriate on matters affecting the security of United Nations staff.

15. Security services for the United Nations are at this time delivered through four separate structures: the Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator; the security component of missions led by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations; the Security and Safety Services at New York, Vienna, Geneva, the International Tribunals and the regional commissions; and the security components of United Nations agencies, funds and programmes.

A. United Nations field security management system

16. The Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator coordinates the activities of the United Nations field security management system. The Security Coordinator reports directly to the Secretary-General. Security in countries in which the United Nations is present is the responsibility of the designated official, who is appointed by the Secretary-General and reports to him through the United Nations

Security Coordinator. In many countries, the United Nations resident coordinator is given this responsibility. Depending on the composition of the United Nations staff in a given country, special representatives of the Secretary-General, executive secretaries of regional commissions or agency representatives may also be appointed as designated officials. They are assisted by the field security coordination officer and an advisory security management team consisting of the representatives of United Nations agencies, funds and programmes at the duty station.

17. The overarching policies, procedures and programmes of work of the United Nations field security management system are governed by the Inter-Agency Security Management Network. The Network, which comprises senior managers who have oversight over security within their respective entities, is responsible for reviewing policies and procedures and monitoring their implementation. It makes recommendations to the High Level Committee on Management of the United Nations System Chief Executives Board for Coordination. The United Nations Security Coordinator is responsible for all policy and procedural matters related to the security of field staff, including making recommendations to the Secretary-General on security conditions and arrangements, including evacuations. The duties of the personnel of the Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator at Headquarters include supporting the field through constant liaison and frequent visits

18. The Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator at this time deploys and provides technical supervision to 129 regular budget and 30 donor-funded international professional field security coordination officers in 64 of the 146 countries where a designated official has been appointed. The primary role of the field security coordination officers is to provide advice to designated officials and their security management teams. They are also required to liaise with Governments and local authorities on security matters, to carry out security threat and risk assessments, to prepare and maintain an array of contingency plans, to monitor and manage staff movements, to provide security training, to report all cases in which United Nations personnel or dependants may be victims of crime, to conduct security surveys and inspections and to take a leading role in crisis management.

19. Field security coordination officers are in many instances hard-pressed or entirely overwhelmed in attempting to advise designated officials and security management teams, while at the same time conducting field security assessments of the necessary frequency, depth and geographic range. Moreover, they have to provide sustained and continuous security guidance and advice to numerous United Nations entities. When the Office of the Security Coordinator has had to assign additional field security coordination officers to meet emergency needs in some countries, it has been obliged to redeploy officers from other countries that are at somewhat lower but still significant risk. In cases such as Afghanistan, Angola, Iraq, Somalia and the Sudan, it has been necessary to deploy up to 20 officers. This has been achieved only through recourse to voluntary contributions or time-consuming cost-sharing agreements at the country level. The shortage of field security officers has also obliged United Nations agencies, funds and programmes to engage their own security officers so as to provide essential protection for their staff and activities. The financing, recruitment, training and deployment of these additional officers, both by the Office of the Security Coordinator and by United Nations agencies, funds and programmes, have required several months, in some cases placing urgent humanitarian interventions at significant risk. Notwithstanding

the recent provision of an additional 29 international and 29 locally recruited posts, there is an urgent requirement for significantly more security posts in the field.

20. The recruitment and administration of field security coordination officers is undertaken by the United Nations Development Programme on behalf of the Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator, while day-to-day management remains the responsibility of the Office of the Security Coordinator. With its current staffing level, the administrative section of the Office at Headquarters is incapable of keeping up with its tasks, which include the selection and technical supervision of the field security coordination officers, the provision of support to the Security Coordinator in managing the budget and other resources and other financial and administrative functions. Those functions cannot be devolved to other organizations and require strengthening so as to put an end to the current inadequate level of support, which obliges field security coordination officers to divert an inordinate amount of time from security functions.

B. Peacekeeping operations

21. At present, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations has a separate security structure for the civilian staff in United Nations peacekeeping missions. The Head of Mission, who is supported by a Chief Security Officer, is responsible for the security of all peacekeeping personnel and reports to the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations. However, in cases where they are present, the spouses and dependants of civilian staff members of the Department's peacekeeping missions also fall under the responsibility of the United Nations Security Coordinator. The United Nations Security Coordinator retains responsibility for providing the Department with security-related technical advice and operational support at Headquarters. The Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator screens security personnel for recruitment by the Department. The political missions of the Department of Political Affairs that are administratively backstopped by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations remain under the United Nations field security management system.

C. Security and Safety Services at United Nations headquarters locations

22. Security and Safety Services operate independently in New York and at seven other Secretariat headquarters locations around the world (Geneva, Vienna, Nairobi, Bangkok, Beirut, Addis Ababa and Santiago), as well as at the International Tribunals in The Hague and Arusha. They provide security and safety protection for headquarters staff and facilities in those locations. They also provide personal security details for senior United Nations officials. Other United Nations organizations, as well as a number of United Nations agencies, funds and programmes, also maintain similar headquarters security services, whether they are provided by uniformed staff members or by contractors.

23. The Security and Safety Services are free-standing entities, with no common governance structure. The service chiefs report to their Director-General or Executive Secretary through their Chief of Administration. In New York, the head of the Security and Safety Service reports to the Assistant Secretary-General for Central Support Services in the Department of Management.

24. While the roles and responsibilities of the Security and Safety Services at the various Secretariat headquarters locations are generally similar in terms of their core functions, the delivery of services locally has evolved with differing standards in respect of operational procedures, staff recruitment, career opportunities and rewards, equipment levels and training standards. The Services have established the United Nations Security and Safety Services Network to coordinate their work, identify best practices and develop operational standards. The members of the Network, which meets annually, have carried out some very useful work, such as the recent efforts to rationalize and unify operating procedures and standards. Additional work remains to be done in other functional areas, such as the use of force, the conduct of investigations, conference security, fire safety and building evacuation and disaster response. This work requires full-time attention by dedicated experts and integration into the wider prospectus of United Nations security procedures.

25. The new security paradigm necessitated a comprehensive review of the profile of security officers in the United Nations. In this new global security environment, the Organization requires robust and agile security teams equipped to understand and utilize modern security technology. At its annual meeting earlier this year, the Security and Safety Services Network established a new profile for the next generation of security officers. The new profile called for an alignment of the career path of security officers with those of uniformed personnel in national law-enforcement agencies elsewhere. This would include a lower age of retirement for lower-ranking officers and subjecting contract renewal and promotion to the successful completion of psychological and physical tests. Such initiatives would require major changes in the personnel management of security officers, which has to include a revised pension scheme to compensate for a lower retirement age. Arrangements for serving security officers to assist them in elevating their physical fitness and technological skills through internal and external training programmes will have to be introduced.

D. United Nations agencies, funds and programmes

26. In order to deliver their mandates under increasingly difficult security conditions, several of the United Nations agencies, funds and programmes operate, recruit and maintain their own security personnel. The roles and responsibilities of the agencies, funds and programmes within the overall United Nations field security management system, both at Headquarters and in the field, are set out in the accountability framework (A/57/365). All United Nations agencies, funds and programmes have full-time or part-time headquarters security focal points who participate in the Inter-Agency Security Management Network, provide technical supervision over any agency security officers in the field and liaise routinely with the Office of the Security Coordinator.

27. There are currently some 164 agency-specific security officers working at field duty stations. Virtually all of them are employed by WFP, UNHCR, UNICEF, UNDP, the World Health Organization (WHO) and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCHR). Those officers, who are recruited against standardized agreed criteria and cleared by the Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator, report to their agency's head of office while at the same time supporting the designated official under the coordination of the field

security coordination officer through an inter-agency "security cell". The main function of agency field security officers is to advise their country representative and to be responsible for the security aspects of activities that are specific to their organization. Some agency security officers are made available on occasion to assist field security coordination officers in their duties or to act on their behalf during periods of absence. Security experts from agencies, funds and programmes also respond along with the Office of the Security Coordinator in temporary emergency reassignments and participate with desk officers from the Office of the Security Coordinator at Headquarters in projects directed by the Inter-Agency Security Management Network and in joint field visits.

28. Agencies employ their own security officers partly because the Office of the Security Coordinator lacks sufficient capacity to provide the necessary number of security officers in high-risk areas, but mainly in order to address special requirements, such as protecting humanitarian supplies and convoys or maintaining security at refugee camps. While a few agencies may deploy their own security personnel, the great majority of United Nations agencies, funds and programmes are not in a position to do so. Therefore, the duties of an agency field security officer fall to field security coordination officers who, particularly in high-risk areas, are already sorely overburdened.

IV. Need for further change

29. While the security structures of the Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, the Secretariat headquarters locations and the agencies, funds and programmes each have their own role, capabilities and challenges, there are a number of system-wide shortcomings arising out of the current United Nations security management arrangements. These shortcomings in structure and capacity reduce significantly the capacity of the United Nations, as a system, to respond adequately and cost-effectively to the threats and risks that now prevail.

30. The United Nations system does not yet have the ability to conduct security threat and risk assessments and timely and comprehensive follow-on planning on either a global or a country-level basis. While great strides have been made in upgrading security threat and risk assessment techniques for use in the field, considerable difficulties remain in providing designated officials with comprehensive, systematic and timely analyses in the field as well as support from Headquarters. As a result, the Organization cannot efficiently calibrate security responses to constantly changing circumstances on the ground.

31. The United Nations is currently facing increasingly complex and sophisticated threats with a fractured security structure. The Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator, with its current reliance for policy development and threat assessment on part-time desk officers with daily operational responsibilities and heavy travel commitments, cannot perform these core technical functions at the level of quality now necessary to support designated officials, security officers and staff members in the field. As the 2003 evaluation team pointed out, those who wish to attack the United Nations are now using new techniques and will seek out any gaps or disconnects within a system. There is a need, therefore, for a full-time security

threat and risk-assessment capacity, as well as for the deepening and further professionalization of security personnel

32. The United Nations, with the qualified exception of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, cannot respond in a timely manner to new security requirements in the field. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations is the only structure within the United Nations security management system that has a dedicated force generation unit and a capacity, albeit limited, for rapid response to security emergencies. The safety and security services are bound by time-consuming budgetary and staffing systems, and the Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator, as well as the agencies, funds and programmes, are also reliant on temporary reassignments or donor funding for quick reaction. As a result, enormous risks are being taken as courageous United Nations workers carry on with urgent humanitarian and other mandates in the field.

33. Security, like accident prevention, is only as good as the weakest link in an interdependent chain of well-designed systems and strict compliance. Despite the experiences of last year, security lapses in the field continue to be a serious and widespread problem. For this reason, a much stronger central monitoring and evaluation capacity, with a body reporting directly to the senior United Nations security official, is essential in order to be able to identify security problems without further delay and to work in a more vigorous, targeted and effective manner towards their earliest possible solution.

34. While the measures taken by the General Assembly, the Secretariat and the United Nations agencies, funds and programmes since August 2003 have improved security readiness with respect to the threat of direct attack at headquarters facilities, serious organizational change remains necessary in order to provide support in the field, where the risks are arguably the greatest. The Ahtisaari panel and other recent studies, including the recommendations of the senior adviser on change management, have all identified the same core weaknesses in the overall United Nations security management system: inadequate resources, inadequate central control of those resources, the dispersal of security responsibility over diverse and insufficiently coordinated structures, a dramatically increased security workload, understaffing of all security elements, an inadequate security threat and risk-assessment capability, insufficient training capacity and lack of attention to the career development of security officers. Those weaknesses must be remedied.

35. At the same time, the United Nations cannot permit itself to succumb to a bunker mentality. The work of the Organization must go on, despite the increased threat. United Nations staff, especially from the humanitarian and development agencies, must have access to vulnerable populations, and those populations must have access to the United Nations. There is no universal guarantee of security, and a degree of risk cannot be avoided. But that risk can and must be mitigated. The Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, in consultation with the Office of the Security Coordinator and a number of United Nations agencies, funds and programmes, prepared a concept paper on risk-management programme delivery strategies for humanitarian activities in high-threat areas. The United Nations has already initiated measures designed to reduce the exposure of its staff in situations where the risk is extremely high. Some of the steps being taken include reducing the number of international staff, with greater reliance on national capacity; supporting programmes from neighbouring countries; and resorting to common services. While

those measures will be of help, if United Nations staff are to carry out their mandate of helping vulnerable populations, they must be provided with the best and highest level of security support possible. This requires adequate security resources, competent professional security staff, clear policies and standards, expert security threat and risk assessments and accountability at all levels. To achieve this and to carry out its programmes in the new threat environment, the United Nations must have the strong support of the Member States.

V. Proposals for strengthening and unifying the security management system

A. Objectives for change

36. The goal of the United Nations security management system is to facilitate the effective and efficient conduct of its programmes and activities while ensuring the safety, security and well-being of staff as a high priority. In order to address the issues and shortcomings outlined in the present report and to strengthen and unify the United Nations security management system, the proposed changes have the following objectives:

(a) To facilitate the continued conduct by the United Nations system of its mandated activities through the development of innovative concepts for operating — both in high-risk areas and in those areas where the United Nations is operating routinely — by better calibrating security arrangements to prevailing conditions as determined by timely and up-to-date security threat and risk assessments; by ensuring a unified and comprehensive response to emergencies; by developing and promulgating security policies, techniques and procedures that are comprehensive, up-to-date and well-understood; and, most importantly, by providing more robust and sustained security advice, assistance and presence in the field;

(b) To enhance the calibre and productivity of all United Nations security personnel through more formalized, integrated and comprehensive human resources management, including training and career management.

37. To attain those objectives, the Secretary-General proposes to strengthen the United Nations security management system and to establish a new Directorate of Security, unifying the existing offices of the United Nations Security Coordinator, the Security and Safety Services and the security component of missions led by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations in a single organizational structure. The Directorate will provide common security policies and standards. It will also have important capabilities that will enable the United Nations to make a quantum leap in the quality and scope of its security arrangements. This in turn will enhance the Organization's ability to conduct its activities in an effective and efficient manner while ensuring the security and safety of its staff posted in different parts of the world. The responsibilities and functions of the Directorate are outlined in section C below. Day-to-day decision-making on matters of security will remain decentralized. Security decisions at the field duty stations will therefore continue to be made by the designated official, advised by the security management team and professional security staff. Security decisions regarding Secretariat personnel in Geneva and Vienna will be made by the Directors-General, with the advice of the

Chief of Security and Safety at the duty station. For the regional commissions, as well as at Nairobi, security decisions will continue to be taken under the existing field security management system.

B. Strengthened capabilities at the country level

38. The accountability framework of the United Nations is a decentralized model. The designated official will continue to be fully responsible and accountable to the Secretary-General for the safety and security of all United Nations personnel at a duty station. In very high-risk areas, additional guidance and controls may be promulgated.

39. Given the designated official's key responsibility for all United Nations personnel, the Secretary-General's policy is for the designated official to be the senior United Nations official at a duty station. The designated official will be authorized to delegate some of his or her day-to-day security duties to appropriate deputies, but will always retain overall responsibility and accountability. The designated official will report to the Directorate of Security on security-related matters regarding all United Nations civilian personnel in the country. However, any recommendation or decision that may affect the conduct of the peacekeeping operation deployed in that country will have to be closely coordinated with the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations in order to satisfy the requirement for the integrated approach provided for in paragraph 54 below. Any disagreement would be brought to the attention of the Secretary-General, who would make the final decision.

40. The senior security officer in-country will be designated as Country Security Adviser by the Directorate of Security. The Country Security Adviser will have operational authority over all United Nations security officers at the duty station, including other agency security officers and personal protection teams. Security officers employed by agencies will function under the authority of the Country Security Adviser, but will also retain a reporting line to their respective organization. The Adviser will report directly to the designated official and through the designated official to the Directorate of Security. This will unify all country security programmes under a single individual, providing unity of command and clarity of accountability. It is proposed that Country Security Adviser posts be graded to reflect this authority and responsibility.

41. In order to respond to the enhanced risks now facing the Organization, there must be both adequate coverage of current duty stations and the ability to respond to emergencies. All field duty stations that are at some degree of actual or potential risk must have a professional security officer. Field security officers are assigned on the basis of the security threat and risk assessment for the particular duty station in question, as well as the scope and complexity of security operations. Some, because of their size or complexity, may require several more security officers than others. There must also be a limited capacity to reassign field security officers as a quick emergency response. In order to meet this requirement, it is necessary to increase significantly the number of international security officers. The creation of additional posts will enable the Directorate to assign security officers and support staff in 33 countries where there is currently no field security coordination officer, and where coverage should no longer be limited to occasional visits by field security

coordination officers assigned to other duty stations in the region. Overall, the proposed basic coverage will stabilize security staffing, ensure the provision of sustained support to designated officials in all field duty stations and allow for the creation of a limited quick-response capacity. Security officers will be able to conduct better security threat and risk assessments, to travel in-country beyond the capitals to perform field assessments and to provide better support to United Nations humanitarian operations.

42. Beyond basic coverage in the field, there are from time to time a number of situations of such complexity, geographic extent, existing or potential risk and urgency of continued United Nations presence that a far more robust in-country capacity is required, including additional security officers and equipment, to ensure the daily integration of protection arrangements into programme delivery and the provision of special compulsory training for all staff members. Such additional functions are currently funded by donor contributions.

43. This critical additional security capacity should no longer be dependent on donor funding. It is therefore recommended that the Directorate of Security be authorized to establish a standby stock of vehicles and communications and other equipment sufficient to supply an operations centre, training and additional field security coordination officers for one year. Should the requirement arise to deploy those resources, the Directorate of Security would be further authorized to expend the resources necessary to recruit the additional staff and to replenish the standby reserve of equipment on an "unforeseen and extraordinary" basis. Revisions to the existing General Assembly authorization for such expenditures would need to be made to facilitate this recommendation, and specific proposals in this regard will be reflected in the addendum to the present report. If a United Nations political or peacekeeping mission is subsequently deployed to the same area, it would be expected that the additional capacity required would be subsumed into the mission budget. In the absence of a United Nations peacekeeping or political mission, the Directorate of Security would seek the necessary resources through the normal financial process and annual performance review so as to sustain any additional capacity for the period during which such capacity is needed. This contingency financing approach would meet the operational security requirement while easing significantly the need for additional full-time posts.

44. While the strengthened cadre of security officers proposed in this report includes enhanced capacity for reassignment as an initial rapid response to emergencies, it will always be difficult to forecast the scale and duration of new requirements in the field. For this reason, it will be essential for the Directorate of Security to maintain and indeed enhance its standby roster of experienced security officers. Administering and tasking this "ready reserve" of security officers will be an important function of the strengthened Directorate of Security.

C. Strengthened capabilities at Headquarters

45. A stronger field presence will not achieve the intended result with respect to conducting security assessments, training, building information networks and advising managers on how to deliver programmes in the face of insecurity without better support from Headquarters. The new Directorate of Security will provide common security policies and standards, a central security threat and risk-

assessment capability, operational and technical support to headquarters and field office security elements, a monitoring and compliance capability, a strengthened training capacity and common recruitment and career management of security personnel. In addition to the proposed substantial increase in the number of security personnel in the field, the Directorate will require a substantial number of new posts — over and above the staffs of the existing Secretariat offices to be amalgamated — in order to be able to carry out its considerable responsibilities.

46. The new Directorate of Security will ensure an effective and fully deployed security management system by developing security strategies, policies and plans and by coordinating their implementation by all actors in the United Nations security management system.

47. The proposed structure of the new Directorate of Security has the following overarching design objectives:

(a) To support and enable the effective conduct of United Nations activities by ensuring a coherent, effective and timely response to all security-related threats and other emergencies;

(b) To ensure effective risk mitigation through the establishment of a coordinated security threat and risk assessment mechanism within the framework of a common, system-wide methodology;

(c) To develop high-quality, best-practice security policies, standards and operational procedures across the United Nations system, including the appropriate degree of standardization;

(d) To support implementation and monitor compliance with those security policies, standards and operational procedures;

(e) To ensure the most cost-effective provision and employment of security personnel by taking advantage of economies of scale and through centrally directed recruitment, selection, training, deployment and career development.

48. The new Directorate of Security will be organized to reflect the organizational goals enumerated above. This will require the creation of a number of new components and the strengthening of others. It is proposed that the new Directorate be headed by an Under-Secretary-General, assisted by an Assistant Secretary-General for Security Operations. There will be three operational divisions, each headed at the D-2 level.

49. The Under-Secretary-General for Security will be responsible for the safety and security of more than 100,000 United Nations staff members and an estimated 300,000 dependants at over 150 duty stations, a considerable number of which are considered high risk. As discussed above, the level of threat against United Nations operations has increased exponentially. The resources necessary to mitigate this threat and to maintain operations must be equally dramatically increased. Given its global responsibilities in the new threat environment, the significant staff and budgetary resources to be managed and the expertise and experience that the incumbent would need to possess, the head of the Directorate should be at the level of Under-Secretary-General. This would allow him/her to speak with authority across the United Nations system and with representatives of Member States at the most senior levels. The Under-Secretary-General and his/her immediate office will be responsible for the overall direction of the United Nations security management

system, for the development of security policies and recommendations for the Secretary-General and overall for the security and safety of United Nations personnel and dependants. The Under-Secretary-General will also supervise a Director of Regional Operations, a Director of Administration and Field Support and a Director of Headquarters Security and Safety Services.

50. In view of the extensive system-wide responsibilities and the external contacts that the Under-Secretary-General will need to maintain, the size and scope of the Directorate and the need to ensure continuity during periods of leave or other absence, the Under-Secretary-General will be assisted by an Assistant Secretary-General who will serve as his/her deputy and focus on the internal functioning and day-to-day management of the Directorate.

51. The Directorate of Security will be equipped with a dedicated inspection and compliance review capability, reporting directly to the Under-Secretary-General. Reviews should be extended to all United Nations entities, including headquarters locations and Department of Peacekeeping Operations missions. The reviews would be conducted by core teams that stayed together for several missions, supplemented as appropriate by desk officers from the operations staff. The review teams would assist duty stations in achieving compliance with security policies and standards such as the minimum operating security standards, the implementation of the security clearance process, mandatory training and the like. The Directorate must also be prepared to enforce standards and to recommend action in the event of non-compliance. In particularly egregious cases, such action could include the removal from the duty station of non-complying staff members and the replacement of agency representatives and designated officials.

52. United Nations staff members should also be afforded a consistent level of safety and security in accordance with clearly articulated and understood security policies and standards. Good efforts have been made by the Inter-Agency Security Management Network and the Security and Safety Services to articulate such policies, resulting, for example, in the widely accepted minimum operating security standards. More needs to be done. A Policy, Planning and Coordination Unit will also be established, reporting directly to the Under-Secretary-General. The Unit will promulgate common policies and standards in all parts of the security management system. It will serve as a small secretariat for the Inter-Agency Security Management Network and be responsible for the drafting and updating of the Field Security Handbook and all specialized security directives.

Director of Regional Operations

53. The Director of Regional Operations will supervise five regional desks and their staff. The desks will be the focal point at Headquarters for the field duty stations, providing primary operational and technical support. The Regional Operations Unit will be responsible for daily security coordination with the field, for responding to all security incidents, for deploying staff to the field as necessary to support the designated official, for investigating the deaths of staff under malicious circumstances, for providing assistance in the management of hostage incidents and for taking appropriate action in the event of the arrest or detention of staff members. Desk officers will be expected to travel extensively in their regions of responsibility to familiarize themselves with the operational environment. The Director of Regional Operations will also operate a dedicated 24-hour watch

capability to provide the Directorate with an internal round-the-clock alerting and response facility on security-related matters for the field as well as headquarters locations.

54. The Director of Regional Operations will also oversee a Threat and Risk Analysis Unit composed of dedicated staff working closely with the regional desks. The Ahtisaari panel identified this deficiency as a key organizational failing. While the Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator has commendably developed a security risk-management methodology for use at the field level, there is no dedicated capacity with the necessary resources at Headquarters for security threat and risk assessment. As such, the Unit will be responsible for the collection, analysis and dissemination of threat and risk information from the country offices, from other components of the United Nations system (such as the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, the Department of Political Affairs, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and United Nations agencies, funds and programmes), from Governments of Member States and from other relevant sources, including the non-governmental community. While the Department of Peacekeeping Operations will no longer recruit security personnel separately, there is an absolute requirement for security staff recruited by the Directorate of Security to work in an integrated approach in support of security within peacekeeping missions. It is foreseen that a unit of the Directorate of Security staff would be located in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations to support the management of the day-to-day security issues within missions led by the Department. The peacekeeping support account would be the source of funding for the posts in this Unit.

Director of Administration and Field Support

55. The Director of Administration and Field Support will handle centrally the recruitment, selection and hiring of international security professionals in accordance with United Nations policies and standards. This will better allow the Directorate to transfer staff from one duty station to another in accordance with the needs of the Organization. In order to achieve those goals, the Directorate must be delegated the authority to recruit and appoint security personnel irrespective of their location. Particular attention will also be paid to career development. In most cases, security personnel should be hired at the entry level and then moved through progressively more responsible assignments across the security management system, including a mixture of headquarters, field and training assignments across a variety of security functions, including the specialized security functions performed by the humanitarian agencies. The objective of the career development system is to develop security generalists trained and prepared through a variety of experiences to assume the most complex security management responsibilities in large, difficult field operations and in senior security posts in the field and at headquarters locations. There will clearly be a transitional period before a fully developed corps is in place, as it will take time to fully achieve this objective.

56. The Director of Administration and Field Support will manage a logistics unit responsible for procuring vehicles and communications and office equipment for field security coordination officers. This will ensure better interoperability and achieve economies of scale, as well as improve the life-cycle management of the equipment procured and allow for the establishment and maintenance of a small standby pool for emergency response. An increasing involvement in facilitating the

system-wide procurement and maintenance of security-related equipment, where practicable and cost-effective, can also be anticipated.

57. As the Directorate of Security will be required to develop and maintain specialized databases, as well as the existing security web site, an information systems section is included in the proposed structure of the Division for Administration and Field Support.

58. The Director for Administration and Field Support will also be responsible for overseeing a sustained and coherent security training programme aimed at multiple clients: the security officers at headquarters and field duty stations, the designated officials, the security management teams and security-related training for United Nations staff in general. The content and standard of delivery of all security-related training must be regulated and harmonized. There is also a need for special focus on course content and design, based on job and training needs analysis, and on consistent standards of delivery both centrally and in-country. A Training Policy and Standards Section will accordingly consist of a small group of curriculum managers, support staff to develop and distribute training packages and several teams of instructors for those courses. Mobile training teams will also stage major incident management exercises in high-risk locations to train in disaster recovery, hostage crises and fire, emergency and evacuation procedures. Other training requirements include induction and orientation for newly recruited field security officers, Country Security Adviser training, Department of Peacekeeping Operations mission security training, personal protection training and other specialized skills. The Directorate will liaise closely with agencies, funds and programmes that have existing capacity and will provide guidance in developing security modules for them. This will also help to meet the need to have security as a component in a number of other programmes and to ensure that the security modules are accurate and consistent with security policies, procedures and practices. Care will be taken not to duplicate training, but rather to manage it more professionally using a needs-based, performance-oriented systems approach.

Director of Security and Safety Services

59. The Director of Security and Safety Services will supervise the Security and Safety Service in New York and provide policy direction, operational guidance and overall technical supervision to the Security and Safety Services in New York and at the other headquarters locations around the world. A Protection Coordination Unit will be established in the office of the Director in order to manage the growing demand for personal protection details in a systematic and coordinated manner. Decisions on the deployment and staffing of personal protection teams will be based on detailed security threat and risk assessments. The Security and Safety Services at the other headquarters locations will retain day-to-day operational responsibility and report to their respective Directors-General or Executive Secretaries, who will serve as designated officials, working in close cooperation with their Chiefs of Administration.

VI. Financing security from the regular budget

60. The gravity of the current security environment and the magnitude of the threat directed at the Organization requires a new look at how security is funded in

the United Nations. As outlined in the previous report (A/58/756), the present cost-sharing arrangements were established under General Assembly resolution 56/255. The principles and modalities behind the decision were that the United Nations field security management system would assume collective responsibility for the safety and security of its staff. Thus, field-related costs, which are incurred either in the field or at headquarters locations through the provision of operational support, would be shared on a proportional basis. Central costs related to the management and direction of the United Nations field security management system would be borne by the United Nations. The associated cost-sharing formula was based on the number of United Nations personnel assigned to or visiting countries that are not members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, and therefore presumably requiring some degree of additional protection from the United Nations field security management system. Data on assigned personnel are collected every second year on the basis of a census carried out by the secretariat of the Chief Executives Board on behalf of the Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator.

61. Experience to date has brought to light a number of serious concerns with respect to financing the Office of the Security Coordinator component of the current United Nations field security management system on the combined bases of cost-sharing under the regular budget and voluntary contributions from Member States. The cost-sharing arrangements have in practice required participating agencies, funds and programmes to rely on voluntary contributions for their assessed share of security costs. Security functions must have consistent and predictable long-term funding.

62. Practical problems have also emerged in implementing the cost-sharing arrangement. The mechanism is labour-intensive, requiring the conduct every two years of a massive worldwide census. Census outcomes and the resulting cost apportionments have proven to be prone to questioning by participating organizations, and reimbursements are generally received late. A number of agencies have also experienced difficulty in forecasting and budgeting accurately for shared security costs, as exact apportionments may not be established during most of the planning stages. Arrears in contributions are in some cases due to the legislative processes of participating organizations and in others to conflicting funding priorities in a context of uncertain and often insufficient funding.

63. The Secretary-General, therefore, reiterates the proposal made earlier this year (see ibid., para. 20) to phase out the current system of cost-sharing. Security is a prerequisite to programme delivery and a core responsibility of Member States. It is recommended that security be provided to the fullest extent possible through a single system funded centrally from the regular budget.

64. As a transitional arrangement, cost-sharing will continue with respect to the initial appropriation approved by the General Assembly in the context of the programme budget for the biennium 2004-2005. However, as a first step to phasing out the current cost-sharing system, it is proposed that the requirements for establishing the new Directorate of Security, as well as the additional costs for new field security officer posts proposed in the present report, be fully financed from the United Nations regular budget. It is further proposed that additional requirements amounting to $8,162,100 relating to the Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator arising from the phase I report (A/58/756), of which the General

Assembly remains seized, as reflected in its resolution 58/295, would be funded from the regular budget. However, from 2006 onward, all costs relating to the Directorate of Security, including the cost of all field security officer posts, would be financed from the regular budget.

65. The present cost-sharing arrangements for those organizations not in the United Nations system that are covered by the United Nations field security management system, including the International Organization for Migration, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the Asian Development Bank, should be retained indefinitely. Likewise, the costs of the malicious acts insurance policy would continue to be shared, in view of the fact that not all United Nations organizations participate in that insurance. Similarly, specific arrangements in place at New York and Vienna for sharing the costs of the central Security and Safety Services between the United Nations and the other entities (UNDP, UNICEF, UNFPA, the United Nations Office for Project Services, the International Atomic Energy Agency, the United Nations Industrial Development Organization and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization) based in the two locations would continue.

VII. Conclusion

66. Recent events have brought the United Nations face to face with the danger that the Organization itself may have become a primary target of political violence. Further attacks in Iraq and Afghanistan remain possible, and there is a distinct possibility of direct and deliberate targeting of United Nations personnel and facilities in other locations as well. Just as the complexity of security management has increased exponentially, so have the consequences of poor preparedness.

67. More complex and lethal threats require a more professional security management system that can respond flexibly, based on continuous analysis. This in turn requires stronger staffing and technical guidance. The United Nations can no longer rely on a small group of overextended security advisers who try valiantly to cope, and on a fragmented security management structure that lacks coherence, consistency and the technical capacity to meet the professional standards now required in this new security climate.

68. Achieving the goals set out in the present report will be a complicated process. Once the Secretariat has received guidance and authority from the General Assembly, a first step at Headquarters will be the appointment of key managers and support staff within the new Directorate of Security. In the field, it will be especially important to move quickly to augment existing structures and support arrangements. A detailed plan of implementation will be required to facilitate a smooth, phased transition to the new way of doing business. Regular consultations with the different parts of the United Nations system will also be necessary.

69. Security is a precondition to programme delivery in many parts of the world. Indeed, in some cases a failure to improve security would leave the Organization facing equally unpalatable alternatives: suspending United Nations activities or continuing them amid unacceptable levels of risk. At the same time, the Organization cannot succumb to a "bunker mentality" and shrink from the work the world's people expect it to do. A degree of risk cannot be avoided; the challenge is to mitigate it.

70. The effort to overhaul the security systems must be a top priority of Member States and of the entire United Nations system. A detailed assessment of the financial requirements relating to the proposed changes will be outlined in an addendum to the present report.